解密中东危局：内塔尼亚胡的"希特勒式"赌局

昨天讨论到伊朗虽然高举反美旗帜，但其国内却已被渗透得千疮百孔。这种现象很大程度上源于其社会经济结构的严重撕裂。特别是伊朗革命卫队以"构建抵抗轴心、输出什叶派伊斯兰革命"为由，获取了大量经商特权和海外利益，导致未能分得利益的国内派系心生不满，从而滋生大量内鬼。

值得注意的是，这些问题的严重性早已暴露，同时也揭示出伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊并未掌握绝对权力。因此，他需要借助反美和反以的政治正确来清洗和压制国内右派势力。这也导致伊朗并未真正做好对美国和以色列的战争准备，在冲突初期显得极为被动。

反观内塔尼亚胡领导的以色列政权，其表现也并非如表面那般英明神武。可以说，内塔尼亚胡政府正在拿以色列的国运及其政治生命进行一场豪赌。事实上，在两年前哈马斯发动"阿克萨洪水行动"突袭以色列之前，内塔尼亚胡政府已因司法改革等问题陷入内外交困的境地，国内抗议不断，政权岌岌可危。这场战争意外地保住了内塔尼亚胡的政治地位。

然而，在过去两年多的时间里，以色列在加沙和黎巴嫩真主党先后爆发大规模冲突，却始终未能取得决定性战果。唯一的意外收获是叙利亚阿萨德政权的突然垮台，让以色列侥幸获利。若以这样的战果收场，内塔尼亚胡政府恐怕仍难逃倒台命运。

内塔尼亚胡的战略就像考场中手足无措的考生：一道题不会就赶紧换下一题，但题目难度却越来越高。既然无法搞定背后有伊朗支持的哈马斯和真主党，那就直接对伊朗出手。但这无疑是一场危险的赌博——伊朗的体量和经济基础远非哈马斯可比。即使伊朗统治集团高层抵抗意志薄弱，以以色列的实力想要彻底打垮伊朗也几乎是不可能的。

这种战略思维与二战时期希特勒的决策如出一辙：在未能迫使英国投降的情况下就贸然发动"巴巴罗萨计划"入侵苏联，使德国重蹈一战时两线作战的覆辙。希特勒当时的逻辑是：只要消灭苏联，孤立的英国就不得不接受和谈。内塔尼亚胡当前的战略思路与之惊人相似。

奥地利经济学派泰斗米塞斯在论述政府干预经济时，曾清晰地描绘过这种恶性循环：当政府试图通过行政手段解决问题时，由于缺乏市场价格反馈机制，其解决方案往往会引发更多新问题，进而需要更多干预，最终陷入难以自拔的困境。如今，内塔尼亚胡政府正走上这条不归路——将原本与哈马斯的局部冲突逐步升级为与伊朗的全面战争。

必须清醒认识到，伊朗问题绝非以色列能够单独解决的。尽管伊朗政府高层在战争初期表现懦弱，但正如前文所述，伊朗革命卫队的对外扩张走的是商业化路线，其高层多是穿军装的富豪。这种商业组织与官僚机构的最大区别在于：其基层部门拥有相当自主权，只受业绩考核约束而不受条条框框限制，具有典型的区域中心化特征。

以色列擅长的高精度情报斩首战术在战争初期能制造混乱和震慑效果，但一旦进入相持消耗阶段就会收效甚微。显然，内塔尼亚胡仍在赌博，他真正的赌注是通过不断升级局势将美国拖下水，借美国之力解决伊朗问题。但这个如意算盘能否打响，恐怕连他自己心里也没底。

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Yesterday, it was discussed that although Iran holds high the banner of anti-America, its domestic territory has been riddled with infiltration. This phenomenon largely stems from the severe fragmentation of its socio-economic structure. In particular, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, under the pretext of "building a resistance axis and exporting the Shiite Islamic revolution", obtained a large number of business privileges and overseas benefits, which led to dissatisfaction among domestic factions that failed to share the benefits and thus gave rise to a large number of insiders.

It is worth noting that the severity of these problems has long been exposed, and it also reveals that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not hold absolute power. Therefore, he needs to rely on the political correctness of being anti-American and anti-Israeli to purge and suppress the right-wing forces in the country. This also led to Iran not truly being well-prepared for war against the United States and Israel, and appearing extremely passive in the early stage of the conflict.

In contrast, the Israeli regime led by Netanyahu has not performed as wisely and militarily as it appears. It can be said that the Netanyahu government is taking a risky gamble on Israel's national fortune and its political life. In fact, before Hamas launched the "Operation Al-Aqsa Flood" to raid Israel two years ago, the Netanyahu government had already been trapped in an internal and external predicament due to issues such as judicial reform, with continuous domestic protests and the regime on the verge of collapse. This war unexpectedly maintained Netanyahu's political position.

However, over the past two years and more, Israel has successively engaged in large-scale conflicts in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, but has yet to achieve decisive results. The only unexpected gain was the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, which allowed Israel to benefit by chance. If it ends up with such achievements, the Netanyahu government is likely to still be doomed to fall.

Netanyahu's strategy is like a candidate at a loss in the examination room: if he doesn't know one question, he quickly moves on to the next one, but the difficulty of the questions keeps increasing. Since it is impossible to deal with Hamas and Hezbollah, which are backed by Iran, then take direct action against Iran. But this is undoubtedly a dangerous gamble - Iran's size and economic foundation are far beyond those of Hamas. Even if the top leadership of the Iranian ruling group has a weak will to resist, it is almost impossible for Israel to completely crush Iran with its strength.

This strategic thinking is exactly the same as Hitler's decision during World War II: to rashly launch the "Barbarossa Plan" to invade the Soviet Union without forcing Britain to surrender, causing Germany to repeat the mistake of fighting on two fronts during World War I. Hitler's logic at that time was that as long as the Soviet Union was eliminated, isolated Britain would have to accept peace talks. Netanyahu's current strategic thinking is strikingly similar to this.

When discussing government intervention in the economy, Mises, a leading figure of the Austrian School of Economics, clearly depicted this vicious circle: when the government attempts to solve problems through administrative means, due to the lack of a market price feedback mechanism, its solutions often give rise to more new problems, which in turn requires more intervention and eventually leads to an inescapable predicament. Nowadays, the Netanyahu government is embarking on this irreversible path - gradually escalating the local conflict with Hamas into an all-out war with Iran.

It must be clearly recognized that the Iran issue is by no means something that Israel can solve alone. Although the top officials of the Iranian government were weak in the early stage of the war, as mentioned earlier, the external expansion of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps followed a commercial route, and most of its top officials were wealthy people in military uniforms. The biggest difference between this kind of business organization and bureaucratic institutions lies in that its grassroots departments have considerable autonomy, are only constrained by performance assessment rather than restricted by various rules and regulations, and have typical regional centralization characteristics.

Israel's high-precision intelligence decapitation tactics, which can create chaos and deterrent effects in the early stage of the war, will have little effect once it enters the stage of stalemate and depletion. Obviously, Netanyahu is still gambling. His real bet is to drag the United States down by escalating the situation and use the power of the United States to solve the Iran issue. But whether this well-planned plan will succeed or not, even he himself is probably not sure.